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FOREWORD




In 1992, Patrick Buchanan ignited a firestorm of controversy
when he exhorted the crowd at the Republican National Convention
to join him in a holy war-a war of Christian values and a battle for
the soul of America.' Critics of Buchanan's speech and other similar
attempts to inject religion into politics raised questions of political
morality: When, if ever, is it appropriate for a citizen in a liberal
democracy to invoke the judgment of God in support of specific
policy initiatives? Does such rhetoric threaten to polarize and divide
the body politic along sectarian lines? Does it threaten to undermine
the mutual deliberation, without which democracy cannot survive?
Those who defended the role of religious-political argument-if
not Buchanan's particular speech-raised equally troubling questions
regarding equal participation in the public square: When, if ever, is
it appropriate to exclude the religious voice from secular politics?
How can a theory of voluntary restraint be compatible with a religious
commitment to a higher law? Are arguments in favor of voluntary
restraint on the part of religious believers simply the first step down
a road leading to coercive exclusion?
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The topic of this
Symposium was also the subject of a program sponsored by the Section on Law &
Religion at the 1996 Annual Convention of the Association of American Law Schools.
Panelists for that program included Professors Kent Greenawalt, Michael McConnell, and
Bruce Ackerman. Professor Greenawalt's Essay in this Symposium is a version of his
remarks delivered at that program.
1. Pat Buchanan, Address at the Republican Party National Convention, Houston,
Texas (Aug. 17, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN file ("There is a religious
war going on in this country. It is a cultural war.., for the soul of America.").
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Political theorists have struggled mightily with these questions
and continue to produce an expanding literature regarding voluntary
restraint on the part of religious believers. Writers like John Rawls2
and Bruce Ackerman3 have articulated theories of self-restraint which
call upon participants in a liberal democracy to argue in terms that
are "accessible" to all citizens, regardless of religious belief. Although
theories of self-restraint come in a variety of forms,4 the general idea
is that, to the extent that religious-based arguments are inaccessible
to nonbelievers, these arguments should be voluntarily removed from
public political debate.'
In response to arguments that appeared to place religious rhetoric
in a special-and suspect-category, a number of political and legal
philosophers more sympathetic to religious arguments in the public
square forwarded theories of their own. The title of this Symposium,
for example, echoes the language of Richard John Neuhaus and his
1984 book, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in
2. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls stated that his purpose was "to make vivid to
ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles
of justice, and therefore on these principles themselves." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 18 (1971). Because diversity of religious belief must be taken as a given in
modem pluralistic democracies, the principles upon which society is based cannot be
derived from any one religious perspective. Id. at 542. More recently, Rawls has urged
the use of "public reason" in public political debate. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1459 (1996) (describing Rawls's idea of public reason).
3. In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Bruce Ackerman argues that government
action should be judged against the "neutrality principle." BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11-12 (1980).
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his
fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is
intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.
Id. at 111, 116. To the extent that religious arguments assert superior knowledge of God
and His purposes, they violate Ackerman's neutrality principle.
4. This variety is reflected in the Essays in this Symposium. See, e.g., Michael J.
Perry, Religious Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1421 (1996)
(containing Michael Perry's discussion of Rawls and Greenawalt).
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978); CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY
(1987); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991); Robert Audi, The Place of
Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993);
Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public
Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993). For a general review of the "dark side of
religious argument," see generally William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGS LJ. 843 (1993) (defending cultural norms that discourage religious argument
about public policy).
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America.6 Neuhaus criticized any secular theory which required the
religious to "check their religious beliefs at the door" before entering
the public square.7 Religious constitutional scholars like Michael
McConnell of the University of Chicago have pointed out that
"Religion in public is at best a breach of etiquette, at worst a
violation of the law. Religion is privatized and marginalized."8 In
fact a number of serious legal scholars and philosophers have
criticized attempts to exclude the religious voice, in whole or in part.'
The approaches are as varied as the authors.
One voice that has not been heard often enough, however, is the
voice of the religious. Most of the articles cited in these footnotes
articulate nonreligious theories of political discourse. Too often, the
debate ignores the point of view of those whose voices are to be
voluntarily restrained. This is a critical silence. After all, to the
extent that voluntary restraint calls upon the religious to present
arguments in a manner that is accessible to nonbelievers, so too must
political theories be presented and critiqued in a manner reasonably
6. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).
7. ld. at 103.
8. Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of
Religion in a Post-modem Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 165.
9. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) (describing general actitudes of
hostility to religion in public life); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); Stephen L. Carter,
Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977;
Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992);
Frederick M. Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 419, 423 (1990) ("American political culture seeks to exclude
religion"). For Carter's assessment of developments since the publication of his book, see
generally Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
118 (1993) (concluding that the position of religious liberty is improving but not healthy).
See also THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER (1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5 (1990).
The role of religion in American public life is too often devalued or
dismissed in public debate, as though the American people's historically vital
religious traditions were at best a purely private matter and at worst essentially
sectarian and divisive.
Such a position betrays a failure of civil respect for the convictions of
others. It also underestimates the degree to which the Framers relied on the
American people's religious convictions to be what Tocqueville described as "the
first of their political institutions." In America, this crucial public role has been
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acceptable to the believer. For this reason, this Symposium brings
together not just political theorists but also voices from a position of
religious belief: the Evangelical Christian, the Roman Catholic, the
rabbi, the Muslim. After all, these are the voices that count; the
voices who will or will not agree to tailor their political participation
to the needs of political theory.
The Symposium begins with Kent Greenawalt. In an Essay
drawn from his recent book Private Consciences and Public Rea-
sons,10 Greenawalt presents a middle position between "exclusive"
theories that would ban religious arguments from the public square
and "inclusive" theories rejecting any restrictions on religious-based
political debate." According to Greenawalt, theories of self-restraint
are best limited to restrictions on public argument-as opposed to
private judgement-and apply most forcefully in the case of public
officials who are involved in the daily making and application of the
law. Public officials, after all, are already in the habit of regulating
their public statements. Moreover, to the extent that this would result
in less-than-candid public statements regarding the true motivation for
a particular government action, we generally do not expect full
disclosure from politicians anyway.
Michael Perry, on the other hand, rejects Greenawalt's idea that
political representatives should be less than candid about their
religious convictions. 2 Taking the affirmative position, Perry argues
that not only should religious rhetoric be tolerated, it should be
encouraged. Given widespread agreement on fundamental moral
premises common to religion, religious discourse can actually lessen
sectarian divisions through its appeal to a common source of public
ethics. According to Perry, even where religious discourse increases
sectarian division, it nevertheless makes a valuable contribution to
public debate about moral issues. Agreeing with theorists like Jeremy
Waldron, Perry argues that reducing public debate to non-controver-
sial arguments would seriously impoverish public discourse. 3
As the final "secular theorist" in the symposium, Lawrence
Solum addresses the "novelty objection" as articulated by Jeremy
Waldron and echoed by Michael Perry. 4 According to the novelty
10. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PU3LIC REASONS (1995).
11. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square-The Building Blocks
for an Intermediate Position, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1411 (1996).
12. Perry, supra note 4, at 1444.
13. Id. at 1436-37.
14. Solum, supra note 2, at 1468-77.
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objection, a rigorous application of John Rawls's ideal of public
reasons would impoverish public political discourse. As Solum
presents the idea: "It is as if someone were to propose that cooking
should be governed by an ideal that ruled out all the ingredients to
which anyone might object. What would be left? There would be
only a tiny number of ingredients, and hence a diet without spice or
variety."' 5 To meet this objection, Solum presents an interpretation
of Rawls's ideal of public reason that would exclude religious
arguments only in very limited circumstances. According to Solum,
under Rawls's ideal, "[w]e can be civil to one another and at the same
time say something new."' 6
In his Essay, Cracks in the Mirrored Prison, David Smolin
presents the first overtly religious response in this Symposium. 7
Speaking as a theologically conservative-or traditionalist-Christian,
Smolin argues that "sectarian religious statements in the political
arena are necessary if people are going to be motivated to pay the
cost of doing what is right."'" Smolin also criticizes the marginalized
role that religion plays in American law schools. Unlike other
interdisciplinary areas represented in American law schools, "Law &
Religion" is often no more than a small branch of constitutional First
Amendment law or a discreet subject of legal philosophy. The better
way, according to Smolin, would be to use the theological insights of
major religions to understand our political and legal culture. Such a
truly interdisciplinary approach would appropriately reflect American
culture and vindicate the responsibility of the legal academy to
include "normative perspectives . . most meaningful to American
society."' 9
Rabbi David Bleich begins his Essay, Godtalk, by recalling a
Yiddish maxim of his grandmother: "If, when traveling in a coach
and wagon, the coachman drives past the door of a church and fails
to cross himself, get out immediately!"'  His grandmother's point
was that a religious person, regardless of creed, is more to be trusted
than an atheist. Rabbi Bleich notes, however, that his bus driver
15. Id. at 1468.
16. ld. at 1485
17. David M. Smolin, Cracks in the Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical Critique of
Secularist Academic and Judicial Myths Regarding the Relationship of Religion and
American Politics, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1487 (1996).
18. Id. at 1501.
19. ld. at 1512.
20. J. David Bleich, Godtalk, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1513, 1513 (1996).
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never makes the sign of the cross when passing a church. This
omission sparks an Essay haunted by the Sherlock Holmsian "bus
driver who did not cross himself."
According to Bleich, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause has cleared not only religion from the halls of
government, it has also made religion suspect in the public square.
In an effort to address this problem at its source, Bleich reviews the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion clauses and concludes
that the Court has wrongly interpreted the Establishment Clause to
prevent nondiscriminatory encouragement of religious activity. Bleich
concedes that his vision of religious accommodation might result in a
return to the days when the Court regularly invoked the values of a
"Christian nation." Nevertheless, the interests of both Jews and
Christians would best be served by rejecting Jefferson's "wall of
separation" in favor of a public norm more accommodating-and
encouraging-of religious faith.
In the final Essay of this symposium, Professor Khaled Abou El
Fadl addresses the difficult questions facing a Muslim in a non-Muslim
society.21 El Fadl notes that all Muslims are under the duty to live
by the dictates of Sharia, Islamic law. Because the Sharia binds every
Muslim wherever they may reside, the Muslim living in a non-Muslim
society faces a dilemma: "If a Muslim decides to reside in or become
the citizen of a secular-liberal democracy, what becomes of the
obligation to live according to a Sharia-based comprehensive view?
To put it more directly, what becomes of the obligation to obey God's
divine law?"' On the other hand, to what extent can the obligations
of the Sharia be reconciled with the political principles of a pluralistic
liberal democracy?
El Fadl seeks a way out of the dilemma by invoking the ancient
Islamic concept of aman. Traditionally, Muslims living in non-Muslim
territories would do so under an agreement of "safe conduct"-the
aman. Under such an agreement, a Muslim may not commit hostile
acts against the host state and may not commit acts of treachery,
deceit, fraud, betrayal, or usurpation. Thus, according to El Fadl,
although a Muslim is ethically bound by Sharia law, that law itself
obligates a Muslim to observe the terms of the aman agreement. El
Fadl also explores the propriety of Muslim participation in politics,
21. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities andSelf-Restraint in LiberalDemocracies,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525 (1996).
22. Id. at 1530.
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and the duty of reciprocity: As Muslims would be offended by
officials basing their decisions on Judeo-Christian values or traditions,
so too Muslims should avoid basing their political stances on strictly
sectarian grounds. Bringing the Symposium full circle, El Fadl notes
that, "[i]f Muslims become involved in the political process, they
should respect a rule of reciprocity which, in turn, requires self-
restraint."'
II. THE WORMHOLE EFFECT
A standard ploy in science fiction is the "wormhole." The
wormhole is a hidden door in the universe through which a traveler
may purposefully-or accidentally-move from one side of the
universe to the other. The idea is that two seemingly disconnected
places are, in reality, connected by way of a kind of whirlpool that
threatens to ensnare the unwary and leave them staring at a different
sky. So too, when it comes to the issue of "voluntary restraint,"
there seems to be a wormhole effect: One begins by discussing
voluntary discourse, but, somewhere along the line, ends up discussing
the subject of legal coercion. Those arguing in favor of voluntary
restraint, of course, endeavor to distinguish their argument from the
issue of legal constraint. For example, Kent Greenawalt carefully
distinguishes his theory from constitutional law.24 Similarly, Law-
rence Solum presents a theory of public reason which relies on moral,
not legal, obligation-.2 Nevertheless, issues of constitutional interpre-
tation lurk in the shadows of these Essays: Greenawalt's distinction
between private speech and government speech tracks the same
distinction in constitutional law.26 Similarly, Michael Perry's critique
of Greenawalt's "excluded non-believer"'27 echoes a debate between
Supreme Court justices regarding "reasonable observers" and the
meaning of "government endorsement of religion."'
23. 111 at 1539.
24. GREENANWALT, supra note 10, at 1417.
25. Solum, supra note 2, at 1466.
26. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (striking down government
sponsored prayers at public school graduation ceremonies) with Rosenberger v. Rector,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (requiring public university to equally fund religious and
nonreligious student publications).
27. Perry, supra note 4, at 1438-45
28. For example, Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion has recommended
replacing the three-pronged "Lemon test" with an "endorsement test." According to
O'Connor, "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
June 1996] 140)7
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Most religious inclusionists, on the other hand, are quick to point
out the inextricable relationship between law and standards of public
morality. David Bleich, for example, argues that the relationship
between law and moral obligation is unavoidable: In America,
restrictions on government action are translated by popular culture
into standards of public morality.29 As if demonstrating the link
between the moral and the legal, Professor Smolin moves from
arguing that religious discourse is essential to political debate to
arguing. in favor of allowing communities to "religiously legitimate"
their public actions through the use of public prayer-a legal issue.30
Finally, Khaled Abou El Fadl discusses whether it is morally
appropriate for a Muslim to live in a land which does not impose
Islamic law.31
The subtle link between moral forms of political discourse and
the constraints of law is also reflected in the case law of the Supreme
Court. For years, a number of justices on the Supreme Court
employed the third prong of the Lemon test, the "Entanglement
Prong," in an explicit attempt to diminish religious-based political
discourse-or, as the Court put it, "political division along religious
lines."32 According to a number of opinions written in the 1970s and
they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. See Bleich, supra note 20, at 1514 ("The elementary distinction between
governmental influence in personal freedoms and societal promotion of moral values has,
in the minds of many, become blurred beyond recognition.").
30. See Smolin, supra note 17, at 1505-06.
31. El Fadl, supra note 21, at 1534.
32. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) ("The numerous judgments
that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may be subtle and
controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the controlling denominations.
As government agents must make these judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness
along religious lines increase."); School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 383 (1985) ("The government's activities in this area can have a magnified impact on
impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and private
school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for divisive rifts along religious lines in
the body politic."); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) ("The Act thus provides
successive opportunities for political fragmentation and division along religious lines, one
of the principal evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect.");
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). The Court in Nyquist quoted Lemon by
stating:
In this situation, where the underlying issue is the deeply emotional one of
Church-State relationships, the potential for seriously divisive political
consequences needs no elaboration. And while the prospect of such divisiveness
may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise survive the
FOREWORD
early 1980s, religiously motivated political discourse was such a danger
that it justified-required-unequal treatment of religious organiza-
tions which would otherwise be eligible to receive government
funding.
Perhaps because the distinction between moral obligations and
legal restraint is not always clear, there is a temptation for
exclusionists and inclusionists to view the arguments of their oppo-
nents with deep mistrust. It is tempting for exclusionists to view
accommodation of religious discourse as a step in the direction of
legally sanctioned religious imposition. Likewise, it is tempting for
inclusionists to view every argument in support of voluntary restraint
as a step in the direction of legally sanctioned discrimination against
religion and religious believers.
Perhaps both sides are right. Perhaps there is a link from one
world to the next; careful if you stand too close, you may cross over.
careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court, it is certainly a "warning
signal" not to be ignored.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625). The Court in Lemon stated:
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and
sincerely dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of their
schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to
achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional,
religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual
political campaign techniques to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare
and voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people
confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes aligned with their faith.
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan,
are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government,
but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622; see also JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (3d
ed. 1986) (The authors infer a fourth requirement that the governmental action must not
create an excessive degree of political division along religious lines. According to the
authors, this fourth condition seems to be simply an aspect of the requirement of no
"excessive entanglement."); Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally a wholesome
process for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is one of
the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall."). But see Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) ("It may well be that because of the importance
of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of opinion along
religious lines as well as other lines. But the same may be said of a great number of other
public issues of our day. In addition, as we said in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,404, n.11
(1983), the question of 'political divisiveness' should be 'regarded as confined to cases
where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial
schools.' "); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines:
The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 205 (1980).
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If so, then the stakes behind this Symposium are very high. All the
more reason to present it.
